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RESHAPING THE CONSTITUTION TO MEET
THE PRACTICAL NEEDS OF THE DAY: THE
JUDICIAL PREFERENCE FOR BINDING
ARBITRATION
I. INTRODUCrION
In little more than two decades, ADR has been transformed
from a rather obscure, seldom-used instrument-a footnote, if
you will, to conventional judicial litigation-into a major mecha-
nism resolving private disputes. ADR, with its wide array of
services and providers, now exists as a parallel system of justice
to our civil justice system.'
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) has indeed become a "jun-
ior varsity justice system" which now handles hundreds of thousands of
private disputes each year. While ADR traces its roots as far back as
the 18th century mercantile community' and several ADR organizations
have now celebrated their 50th birthdays,4 the growth of ADR into a
major mechanism for resolving private disputes is a fairly modern phe-
nomenon. Even more remarkable is that Congress did not legislate this
new alternative justice system, nor was it the consequence of any state
effort to undermine the federal judiciary. Nor did the people create it
by any constitutional amendment. Rather, the federal courts, attempt-
ing to clear their own crowded court dockets, have been the moving
force that has transformed ADR into a court-sanctioned dispute resolu-
tion mechanism that now parallels the civil justice system.'
The courts' new mission to combat overcrowded dockets seemingly
1. Kathryn M. Werdegar, The Courts and Private ADR: Partners in Serving Justice, 51
DISP. RESOL. J. 52, 52 (Apr.-Sep. 1996) (published version of the California Supreme Court
Justice's presentation before the American Arbitration Association's Arbitration Day in
January, 1996).
2. See Stuart H. Bompey et al., The Attack on Arbitration and Mediation of Employment
Disputes, 13 LAB. LAW 21,23 (1997).
3. See JOHN S. MURRAY ET AL., PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 527-30 (2d ed.
1996).
4. The AAA, for example, was founded in 1926. See A Beginner's Guide to Alternative
Dispute Resolution (visited Feb. 28, 1996) <http:lwww.adr.orglguides/guide.html>.
5. See MURRAY, supra note 3, at 527-30.
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arose with the recent employment rights explosion. A decline in collec-
tive bargaining, followed by the rise of federally-created employment
rights without an accompanying increase in funding for the increased
administrative burden on the federal courts, has mainly accounted for
the docket pressure that has preoccupied the modem courts.6  Yet,
while private parties have always used alternative mechanisms to re-
solve contract disputes for reasons of expediency, economy, and pri-
vacy,7 only in the past two decades has the U.S. Supreme Court allowed
statutory employment-related claims to be resolved in a private forum.8
Thus, while the increase in statutory employment rights may explain
docket-overcrowding, the subsequent increase in ADR cases undoubt-
edly could not have occurred without the Court's blessing.
In 1983, the Court announced a new "liberal federal policy endors-
ing arbitration" for the effective resolution of statutory employment
claims.9 The Court found the new liberal policy in the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act (FAA), even though the FAA dated back to 1925 and for
nearly sixty years prior Courts had rejected its application in employ-
ment-related disputes.0 Nevertheless, having declared the new national
policy, the Court now could allow an increasing number of employ-
ment-related disputes to be shifted out of the federal judiciary and into
binding arbitration.
Yet this new "junior varsity justice system" did not arise by sheer
Court declaration alone. The Court needed to mold old constitutional
principles to fit the new national policy that it claimed preferred ADR
to traditional means for resolving statutory claims. The Seventh
Amendment's right to trial by jury had to be fashioned into less than an
absolute right. The old constitutional separation of powers doctrine
had to be reshaped into a more flexible canon--one less concerned with
form than function. Article III's language needed an updated transla-
tion. Finally, the fundamental guaranties of procedural due process had
to be retrofitted to the arbitral forum, to somehow validate the resolu-
tion of federal rights in a non-judicial forum.
6. See David E. Feller, Fender Bender or Train Wreck?: The Collision Between Statutory
Protection of Individual Employee Rights and the Judicial Revision of the Federal Arbitration
Act, 41 ST. Louis U. L.J. 561,563 (1997).
7. See MURRAY, supra note 3, at 524-25.
8. See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477
(1989) (overturning Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953)).
9. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
10. See Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, ch. 392, §§1-16, 61 Stat. 669 (amended 1947)
(codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§1-16 (1994)).
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In short, over the past two decades, the Court's desire to clear judi-
cial calendars had not come without substantial constitutional tamper-
ing. Yet, while the Court's operation to streamline the Constitution to
meet the pressing needs of the day may have been a success thus far,
some have argued that the Court's "patient may be dying."" This
Comment agrees.
Part II of this Comment briefly reviews the Court's attempts to shift
statutory employment claims into binding arbitration. It begins with the
1953 interpretation of the FAA in Wilko v. Swan" and concludes with
the D.C. Circuit's novel decision in Cole v. Burns International Security
Services in 1997.'" Part II also reviews the attempts of the modem U.S.
Supreme Court to mold old constitutional principles to help clear
crowded dockets.14 It focuses on those key cases in the past two decades
that have reshaped the Constitution to allow for the binding arbitration
of statutory claims.
Part III examines the Court's redefinition of the Seventh Amend-
ment and its separation of powers doctrine, along with the modifica-
tions the Court has made to its traditional Article III and "procedural
due process" principles. It questions the Court's jurisprudence over the
past two decades that in many cases contradicts traditional principles
that have stood for more than two centuries. Part III also explores the
fundamental issues that the modem Court has tended to ignore as it has
fashioned the Constitution into a more functional document.
Finally, Part IV concludes suggesting that, after two decades of the
Court's functional constitutionalism, the courts may be the only faction
11. Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513,
1520 (1991).
12.346 U.S. 427 (1953).
13. 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Cole is a novel decision for three reasons: (1) it or-
dered arbitration of a Title VII claim contrary to the Court's 1974 decision in Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36 (1974); (2) it concluded that arbitration could be required as a
condition of employment; and (3) it required employers to pay for the arbitration. See An-
drew W. Volin, Recent Legal Developments in the Arbitration of Employment Claims, 51
DISP. RESOL. J. 16,17 (1997).
14. This Comment treats statutory claims as if Article III courts held exclusive jurisdic-
tion over them. However, Article III courts share jurisdiction over common law claims with
their state counterparts, particularly in matters relating to Title VII. See Yellow Freight Sys.,
Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820 (1990). Recognizing, however, that most state constitutions
contain provisions analogous to Article III, a separate discussion regarding state constitu-
tional issues would be redundant. See, e.g., Neil C. McCabe, Four Faces of State Constitu-
tional Separation of Powers: Challenges to Speedy Trial and Speedy Disposition Provisions,
62 TEMP. L. REV. 177, 184 (1989) (arguing that explicit provisions for separation of powers
are found in a majority of state constitutions). Therefore, the state constitutional issues are
not explored here.
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that champions a preference for ADR in the resolution of statutory
employment claims.
II. 1977-1997: Two DECADES OF RESHAPING THE CONSTITUTION
Although traceable in some aspect as far back as the country's colo-
nial period, modem arbitration really developed in the context of col-
lective bargaining.'" Unions and employers negotiating labor contracts
agreed that, in any dispute regarding contract interpretation or rights,
the parties would jointly select a neutral arbitrator to determine the
parties' intent and the extent of their contract. The parties agreed that
the arbitrator's decision was binding and, therefore, arbitration pre-
sented an expeditious and economical means for dispute resolution.
Because the courts considered the arbitrator's construction of the
contract to be what the parties bargained for, they carved out a very
limited role for judicial intervention."6 They limited judicial review to
determining whether an appealed claim was actually governed by the
contract and whether the arbitrator acted within the scope of his neutral
authority.'7 Nor were the courts concerned with what processes or what
facts the arbitrator used to reach his decision; the courts gave due def-
erence to the arbitrator's decision 8 and only set aside a decision for
"manifest disregard" of the law.'9 For the courts, the question was "not
whether the arbitrator . . . erred in interpreting the contract," but
15. See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1473; see also William Catrone Jones, Three Centuries of Com-
mercial Arbitration in New York: A Brief Survey, 1956 WASH. U. L.Q. 193, 209-10.
16. Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (the Taft-Hartley Act)
granted federal courts jurisdiction to hear suits for violation of collective bargaining agree-
ments. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1994); see also United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel &
Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
17. See generally Theodore St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A
Second Look at Enterprise Wheel and Its Progeny, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1137 (1977).
18. See United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29,38 (1987).
19. "Manifest disregard" has no one definition. The First Circuit requires the challenger
to show that an award is "(1) unfounded in reason or fact; (2) based on reasoning so palpably
faulty that no judge, or group of judges, ever could conceivably have made such a ruling; or
(3) mistakenly based on a crucial assumption that is concededly a non-fact." Advest, Inc. v.
McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 8-9 (1st Cir. 1990). The Sixth Circuit requires a challenger to show
that "(1) the applicable legal principle is clearly defined and not subject to reasonable de-
bate; and (2) the arbitrators refused to heed that legal principle." Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Jaros, 70 F.3d 418, 421 (6th Cir. 1995). The Seventh Circuit says an
award is in manifest disregard of the law if the arbitrator "deliberately disregarded" what he
or she knew to be the law. Health Servs. Mgmt. Corp. v. Hughes, 975 F.2d 1253, 1267 (7th
Cir. 1992).
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"whether [he] interpreted the contract. '
To capitalize on labor's success with arbitration, parties to commer-
cial contracts likewise attempted to resolve their disputes through arbi-
tration. In 1925, stressing the need to avoid the delay and expense of
litigation, Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) which
provided for arbitration of controversies under any contract involving
interstate commerce.2' The FAA stipulated that commercial arbitration
agreements would be just as valid under the law as any contract,2 and
thereafter the courts applied the FAA to contract controversies arising
under various statutory provisions.' Pursuant to the FAA, courts easily
reviewed commercial contract claims under the same auspices as they
reviewed collective bargaining agreements.
The Supreme Court, however, did not find the FAA free of limita-
tions. In Wilko v. Swan, the Court declined to uphold a New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) arbitration because the FAA conflicted with
the Securities Act's provision forbidding waiver of, the claimant's right
to sue in court.24 Likewise, in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 2 the Court
went even further in holding that arbitration could not extend to the
adjudication of a Title VII claim.
[F]inal responsibility for enforcement of Title VII is vested with
federal courts. [Title VII] authorizes courts to issue injunctive
relief and to order such affirmative action as may be appropriate
to remedy the effects of unlawful employment practices ....
Taken together, these provisions make plain that federal courts
have been assigned plenary powers to secure compliance with
Title VII.
In spite of Wilko's and Gardner-Denver's limitations, however, the
Supreme Court still saw arbitration as a practical and expeditious
means to clear the crowded federal court dockets. In 1983, the Court
announced that the FAA manifested a "liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration"' and in 1985, declaring its "strong belief in the efficacy of
20. Hill v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 814 F.2d 1192,1195 (7th Cir. 1987).
21. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
22. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
23. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427,432 n.13 (1953) (listing cases).
24. See id. at 438.
25.415 U.S. 36 (1974).
26. Id. at 44,45 (citations omitted).
27. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
1998]
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arbitral procedures," ' the Court upheld a mandatory arbitration clause
for resolution of rights under the Sherman Act.29 In Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler-Chrysler Plymouth, Inc.,° the Court embraced arbitration
with new fondness: "[To realize] the potential of these tribunals for the
efficient disposition of legal disagreements arising from commercial re-
lations.., the courts will need to 'shake off the old judicial hostility to
arbitration."'3' Two years later, in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon,32 the Court reflected Mitsubishi's affection for arbitration by
distinguishing Wilko and compelling arbitration of a nearly identical
claim brought in Wilko. Finally, in 1989, in a 5-4 decision, the Court
overruled Wilko stating that it had "fallen far out of step with [the
Court's] strong endorsement of the federal statutes favoring [arbitra-
tion].""
In 1991, in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson,4 the Supreme Court refused
to extend Gardner-Denver's Title VII distinction to a plaintiff's claim
based on the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA),
relying instead on those 1980s cases that seemed more hospitable to ar-
bitration. The Gilmer Court held that a statutory claim arising under a
commercial employment contract could be subject to binding arbitra-
tion because the arbitral forum provided a fair opportunity for the vin-
dication of that claim.35 More importantly, the Gilmer Court (quoting
Mitsubishi) contended that "by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a
party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it
28. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler-Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631 (1985).
29. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994).
30. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 638 (citation omitted).
31. Id.
32.482 U.S. 20 (1987).
33. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
34. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). The Gilmer Court dis-
tinguished Gardner-Denver for three reasons: (1) the issue there was that Alexander did not
contractually agree to arbitrate his Title VII claim; (2) an important concern was whether
Alexander's interests were properly advanced by the union; and (3) the case was "not de-
cided under the FAA, which, as discussed above, reflects a 'liberal policy favoring arbitration
agreements."' Id. at 35. (citation omitted). Gilmer's distinction, however, is hardly support-
able. Gardner-Denver only mentioned in a footnote the issue regarding what Alexander
agreed to and simply mentioned in another footnote the Court's concern about the union
properly advancing Alexander's claim. Moreover, in a third footnote, the majority declared
that "[f]or the reasons stated in Parts III, IV, and V of this opinion, we hold that the federal
policy favoring arbitration does not establish that an arbitrator's resolution of a contractual
claim is dispositive of a statutory claim under Title VII." Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S 36, 47
n.6. (1974). Arguably, the Gilmer Court did not just distinguish Gardner-Denver, but actu-
ally overruled it.
35. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31.
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only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial fo-
rum. '3 6 Furthermore, "having made the bargain to arbitrate ... the
burden [was on the claimant] to show that Congress intended to pre-
clude a waiver of a judicial forum .... ""
Immediately following the Court's seminal holding in Gilmer, the
lower courts embraced arbitration with similar affection and compelled
arbitration of a variety of statutory claims." Finally, in 1997, following
Gilmer's lead, the D.C. Circuit ruled that a statutory claim arising under
a private employment contract could also be decided in an arbitral fo-
rum.39 The Cole court acknowledged that it would be unlawful for an
employer to force an employee to give up his substantive rights, but
resting on Gilmer, it did not extend this waiver prohibition to the forum
for vindicating those rights.4° Although the court reasoned that an em-
ployee cannot be required as a condition of employment to waive access
to any forum or even to a neutral forum, it found arbitration in general
to be a satisfactory neutral forum to resolve Cole's claim.41
Unlike Gilmer, however, which relied on the quasi-judicial resources
of the NYSE to oversee the arbitration of an employment claim arising
under its auspices, the D.C. Circuit relied exclusively on a volunteer as-
sociation-the American Arbitration Association (AAA)-to vindicate
the claimant's statutory rights.42 The Cole court neither explained, nor
discussed, who would guarantee procedural fairness in the vindication
of Cole's claim. It simply relied on the arbitrator's ethics and profes-
sional standards, embodied in arbitration's rich tradition, to assure Cole
justice under the law.43
Along with its new-found "liberal federal policy favoring arbitra-
tion,"" the Court also proceeded to adapt its Seventh Amendment ju-
36. Id: at 26 (citation omitted).
37. Id. (citation omitted).
38. See, e.g., Bender v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 789 F. Supp. 155 (D.N.J.
1992) (compelling compulsory arbitration of a Title VII claim); Fletcher v. Kidder, Peabody
& Co., 584 N.Y.S. 2d 838 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (compelling arbitration of a state race dis-
crimination claim).
39. See Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
40. See id at 1482.
41. See id
42. The American Arbitration Association is a private non-profit organization founded
in 1926 to foster the study of arbitration. The Association governs much of the country's ar-
bitration, and contracts frequently stipulate that disputes will be governed by the Associa-
tion's rules. See generally MURRAY, supra note 3, at 527-30.
43. See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1485.
44. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. V. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
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risprudence and its traditional separation of powers doctrine into more
functional tools to help streamline the court dockets. Beginning in 1977
with Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission,45 the Court began to move away from its traditional Sev-
enth Amendment posture to a more flexible approach to the right to a
jury trial. The Court's classic approach as to whether the Seventh
Amendment reached a claim involved asking whether the matter which,
from its nature, [was] the subject of a suit at common law. If so, it de-
served a jury trial.46
By common law, (the Framers of the Seventh Amendment)
meant.., not merely suits, which the common law recognized,..
• but suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained and de-
termined .... [The Seventh] amendment then may well be con-
strued to embrace all suits which are not of equity and admiralty
jurisdiction, whatever may be the peculiar form which they may
assume to settle legal rights.47
Nevertheless, the Atlas Court distinguished its classic approach by
resurrecting the public/private rights distinction made more than 120
years earlier in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement
Co.:
There are matters, involving public rights, which may be pre-
sented in such form that the judicial power is capable of acting
on them, and which are susceptible of judicial determination, but
which Congress may or may not bring within the cognizance of
the courts of the United States, as it may deem proper.
Reasoning that the claim at issue in Atlas did not involve purely pri-
vate rights, the Court held that "Congress [was] not required by the
Seventh Amendment to choke the already crowded federal courts with
45.430 U.S. 442 (1977).
46. See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989). The test for whether an
Article III court is necessary for an action at law is the same as the test for whether a party
has a Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury. Id
47. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. 474,479 (1830).
48. 59 U.S. 272, 284 (1855). The public/private rights distinction was clarified in North-
ern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). "Public" rights
arise between the government and others. "Private" rights are those which arise under stat-
ute, but where the government is not a party to the claim. Id. at 69-70.
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new types of litigation ... ."" The Atlas Court argued that "the Seventh
Amendment was never intended to establish the jury as the exclusive
mechanism for factfinding in civil cases,"' 5 and although "[t]he jury was
the factfinding mode in most suits in the common-law courts,... it was
not exclusively so.... ,"' But, the Court cautioned that "in cases which
do involve only 'private rights,' [it would accept] factfinding by an ad-
ministrative agency, without intervention by a jury, only as an adjunct
to an Art. III court ..... ,2
Thus, three years later, in United States v. Raddatz, the Court ap-
proved the use of adjunct factfinders in the adjudication of purely pri-
vate constitutional rights.53 Noting that a failure to approve the Federal
Magistrates Act at issue in Raddatz "would largely frustrate the plain
objective of Congress to alleviate the increasing congestion of litigation
in the district courts," the Court approved the use of magistrates for
hearing certain motions.m So long as the magistrates were subject to
sufficient control by an Article III district court and "so long as the ul-
timate decision [was] made by the district courts," the Court found that
the scheme posed no constitutional threat.'5
Despite the Court's newly formulated functional approach to the
right to trial by jury, in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co., a divided Court struck down an attempt to have common
law claims decided by a bankruptcy court.56 A plurality concluded that,
under the congressional scheme in Pipeline, so much authority had been
vested in bankruptcy judges-who did not possess the judicial power of
the United States-that the district courts no longer uniquely retained
the "'essential attributes' of the judicial power."' Justices Rehnquist
and O'Connor concurred in the judgment, though admitting that the
Court's Article III jurisprudence was fraught with "frequently arcane
distinctions and confusing precedents., 58 Nonetheless, they agreed that
because in Pipeline, "[a]ll matters of fact and law ... [were] to be re-
solved by the bankruptcy court in the first instance, with only tradi-
49. Atlas, 430 U.S. at 455.
50. Id at 460.
51. Id. at 458.
52. Id. at 450 n.7.
53. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980).
54. Id. at 676 n.3.
55. Id. at 683.
56. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S 50 (1982).
57. Id. at 84-85.
58. Id. at 90.
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tional appellate review by Art. III courts ... the bankruptcy court [was]
not an 'adjunct' of either the district court or the court of appeals."59
Writing in dissent, Justices White, Powell, and Chief Justice Burger
highlighted the Court's division by arguing that it was
too late to return to the simplicity of the principle pronounced in
Art. III and defended so vigorously and persuasively by Hamil-
ton in the Federalist Nos. 78-82 .... Article III [should not] be
read out of the Constitution; rather, it should be read as ex-
pressing one value that must be balanced against the competing
constitutional values and legislative responsibilities.
61
Of course, the simple principle the Justices referenced was that
"[tjhe judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Su-
preme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may ... es-
tablish.
61
Nevertheless, in Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg,6 the Court clari-
fied how its revised Seventh Amendment posture was linked to the con-
stitutional values of Article III by explaining that
Congress may devise novel causes of action involving public
rights free from the strictures of the Seventh Amendment if it
assigns their adjudication to [non-Article III] tribunals without
statutory authority to employ juries as factfinders. But it lacks
the power to strip parties contesting matters of private right of
their constitutional right to a trial by jury. As we recognized in
Atlas Roofing, to hold otherwise would be to permit Congress to
eviscerate the Seventh Amendment's guarantee .... 63
While the Granfinanciera majority upheld the right to a jury trial,
the Court nonetheless remained strongly divided over Congress' power
to remove statutory claims from the province of a jury in an Article III
court. Three Justices dissented that the bankruptcy courts at issue were
"specialized tribunals where juries have no place," whose workings
would now be needlessly disrupted.' Justice Scalia, concurring alone
59. Id at 91.
60. Id at 113 (White, J., dissenting).
61. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1.
62.492 U.S. 33 (1989).
63. Id. at 51-52 (citation omitted).
64. Id. at 81, 83 (White, J., dissenting).
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however, objected to the Court's use of intuitive judgments regarding
the practical effects of these congressional schemes. The separation of
powers doctrine, he argued, "must be anchored in rules, not set adrift in
some multifactored 'balancing test'- and especially not in a test that
contains as its last and most revealing factor 'the concerns that drove
Congress to depart from the requirements of Article III."'' '
Of course, the test to which Justice Scalia referred was the balancing
test announced three years earlier in Commodity Futures Trading
Commission v. Schor.6" In Schor, the Court determined that a common
law claim, ancillary to a public claim, could be arbitrated outside the ju-
risdiction of an Article III court. Refusing to adopt formalistic and un-
bending rules in its separation of powers doctrine, the Schor Court set
down five factors it would weigh in assessing congressional schemes
"with an eye to the practical effect that the congressional action will
have on the constitutionally assigned role of the federal judiciary." 67 In
holding that the magnitude of intrusion on the Judicial Branch resulting
from the congressional scheme in Schor was only de minimis, the Court
reasoned that it would
defeat the obvious purpose of the legislation to furnish a prompt,
continuous, expert and inexpensive method for dealing with a
class of questions of fact which are peculiarly suited to examina-
tion and determination [outside an Article III court] .... We do
not think Article III compels this degree of prophylaxis."
Furthermore, the Court contended, even though "Congress gave the
CFTC authority to adjudicate such matters, the decision to invoke this
forum [was] left entirely to the parties and the power of the federal ju-
diciary to take jurisdiction of these matters [was] unaffected."69 Never-
theless,
if Congress created a phalanx of non-Article III tribunals
equipped to handle the entire business of the Article III courts
without any Article III supervision or control and without evi-
dence of valid and specific legislative necessities, the fact that the
parties had the election to proceed in their forum of choice
65. Id at 70 (citation omitted) (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
66. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
67. Id at 851.
68. Id at 856 (citations omitted).
69. Id at 855.
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would [not necessarily] save the scheme from constitutional at-
tack.0
The Schor Court went on to explain the constitutional difficulties
such a scheme would impose on its traditional separation of powers
doctrine. Admitting that its precedents did not admit of easy synthesis,
it nonetheless announced that the constitutionality of assigning adjudi-
cative functions to a non-Article III court would be assessed by refer-
ence to the purposes underlying Article 111.71 Such an inquiry would be
guided by the principle that "practical attention to substance rather
than doctrinaire reliance on formal categories should inform the appli-
cation of Article III.,,72
Concurrent with the Court's new interpretation of the Seventh
Amendment and Article III, its practical attention to substance rather
than form also began to dominate its "due process" jurisprudence.
During the same twenty-year period, the Court directed that procedural
due process could be streamlined to more accurately reflect the interest
at stake, the value of additional safeguards, and ultimately, the fiscal
and administrative burdens due process requires.73 Yet, the same period
also saw the Court "privatize" procedural due process in decisions that
increasingly blurred the distinction between who was due the process
and who was required to deliver it.
For example, in 1976, in Mathews v. Eldridge,74 the Supreme Court
relaxed the procedures a governmental agency must afford a claimant
before withholding a government benefit. The Court held that where
the consequences of rights deprivation were less serious, "the judicial
model of an evidentiary hearing [was] neither required, nor even the
most effective, method of decisionmaking in all circumstances."'75
Rather, the Court reasoned that the "ultimate balance involves a de-
termination as to when, under our constitutional system, a judicial-type
model must be imposed .... All that is necessary is that the procedures
be tailored, in light of the decision to be made, to the 'capacities and
circumstances of those who are to be heard."' 76
70. Id.
71. See id. at 847.
72. Id. at 848.
73. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 322.
76. Id. at 318-19.
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In 1985, in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill,' the Court
nevertheless clarified that under the Due Process Clause, once the gov-
ernment conferred certain substantive rights it could not take them
away except pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures. Em-
ploying the Mathews balancing test to the dismissal of a school em-
ployee denied a pre-termination hearing, the Loudermill Court ordered
that at a minimum, an employee deserved notice, an explanation of the
charges against him, and the opportunity to present his side of the story
before being dismissed.78
Curiously, however, two years later the Court tied its reasoning in
Loudermill to the due process rights of an employee dismissed by a pri-
vate employer in Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc.79 Yet, the balance this
time was not the government's interest (as in Loudermill), but the pri-
vate employer's interest versus the severity of depriving a person of a
means of livelihood. "While a fired worker may find employment else-
where," the court submitted, "the injurious effect a retaliatory discharge
can have on an employee's financial status ... must be considered."'
Brock extended the trend begun two years earlier in Walters v. Na-
tional Ass'n of Radiation Survivors;' namely, that the Court's tradi-
tional due process jurisprudence was moving in a different direction. In
Walters, the Court had approved the use of nontraditional decision-
making that "does not contemplate the adversary mode of dispute
resolution utilized by courts in this country." Upholding a Veterans'
Administration rule effectively barring claimants from hiring attorneys,
the Court noted that "[t]he flexibility of our approach in due process
cases is intended in part to allow room for other forms of dispute reso-
lution .... "3
Thus, in 1991 the Gilmer Court finally made room for its flexible
due process in alternative dispute resolution. As in Brock, the Court
found that the NYSE arbitration rules protected against bias, allowed
for discovery, depositions and subpoenas, and allowed for written
awards and full equitable relief. It summarily rejected Gilmer's chal-
lenge to the adequacy of arbitration procedures:'
77.470 U.S. 532 (1985).
78. See id at 546.
79. 481 U.S. 252 (1987).
80. Ia at 263 (citation omitted).
81. 473 U.S. 305 (1985).
82. Id at 309.
83. Id. at 326.
84. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20,30-31 (1991).
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[T]here has been no showing in this case that the NYSE... pro-
visions ... will prove insufficient to allow ADEA claimants such
as Gilmer a fair opportunity to present their claims. Although
those procedures might not be as extensive as in the federal
courts, by agreeing to arbitrate, a party "trades the procedures
and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity,
informality, and expedition of arbitration.""5
In 1997, the D.C. Circuit expanded on the due process requirements
a private arbitral forum must provide. The Cole court looked to those
procedures referenced in Gilmer and also to those promulgated by the
AAA to assure that Cole received a fair arbitration hearing.86 The Cole
court adopted all of Gilmer's referenced rules and also the AAA's Rule
35" relating to administrative fees and Rule 36m relating to shared ex-
penses. Concerned that Cole not be forced to pay for justice, the court
then ruled that the claimant must not be required to pay any of the arbi-
trator's fee.89
The Cole court did not stop there however. It went on to suggest
that, in the future, arbitrators should adopt additional procedural safe-
guards if they continued to review statutory claims. The court said the
arbitrators must: (1) educate themselves about the law, (2) demonstrate
a working knowledge of the statutes, (3) follow precedent, (4) adopt an
attitude of judicial restraint, (5) actively ensure the record is adequately
developed, and (6) provide procedural fairness.'o
In summary, beginning with Atlas in 1977, the Court's constitutional
jurisprudence took on a more pragmatic and functional appearance that
would continue for two decades. The Court had made an important
85. Idt at 31 (citation omitted).
86. See Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1480-86 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
87. A filing fee of $500 must be advanced by the initiating party, subject to final appor-
tionment by the arbitrator in the award, and an administrative fee of $150 per hearing day
must be paid by each party, but the AAA may, in the event of extreme hardship on any
party, defer to reduce the administrative fee. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASS'N, NATIONAL
RULES FOR THE RESOLUTION OF EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES Rule 35 (1996).
88. The expenses of the arbitration, including required travel and other expenses of the
arbitrator, AAA representatives, and witnesses, will be shared equally by the parties, unless
the parties agree otherwise or the arbitrator directs otherwise in the award. See id. at Rule
36.
89. The court reasoned that it would be unacceptable to require Cole to pay an arbitra-
tor's fees, because such fees are unlike anything that he would have to pay to pursue his
statutory claim in court. See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1484.
90. See id. at 1488.
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doctrinal shift from its classic Seventh Amendment jurisprudence 9 to
"restrict the use of the civil jury, if contemporary needs made that the
best policy." 9' This shift was followed by Schor's more functional ap-
proach to the Court's traditional separation of powers doctrine to help
clear the already crowded dockets of the federal courts. At the same
time, even "due process under the law" was given a more flexible
meaning to help streamline the adversarial process. Thus, it came as no
surprise that during the same two decades, the Court would embrace
ADR with a new fondness and transform its own preference for arbitra-
tion into a new liberal policy favoring arbitration.
Yet, while the Court seemed to move quickly to clear its over-
crowded dockets, it had largely ignored the wear it had worked on old
constitutional doctrines. And, while shifting statutory claims into ADR
comported with its new mission, the modem Court nevertheless
avoided discussing the constitutionality of its newfound "junior varsity
justice system." Rather, like the litigants increasingly pushed to use an
alternate forum to expeditiously resolve statutory disputes, the Court's
old constitutional doctrines would have to similarly yield to the practi-
cal necessity of the day.
III. OLD CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINES MUST YIELD TO THE
PRACTICAL NECESSITY OF THE DAY
The Court's operation to clear crowded dockets has required it to
considerably bend old constitutional principles. Because the Court is
singularly empowered to interpret the Constitution and determine what
the law says, seemingly all of its modem interpretation is as unques-
tionably correct as its more traditional translation. Yet, the Court has
never fully explained why two-hundred year old doctrinal principles
could suddenly yield to the practical necessity of clearing court calen-
dars. For example, pursuant to its separation of powers doctrine, the
Court has never examined why if Congress had such a clear preference
for arbitration, the FAA did not constitute congressional encroachment
on the Court's traditional Article III jurisdiction. Nor has it ever ex-
plained how private litigants can remove their claims to an alternate fo-
91. See Roger W. Kirst, Administrative Penalties and the Civil Jury: The Supreme Court's
Assault on the Seventh Amendment, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 1281, 1291 (1978). See also Charles
W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REv. 639,
639-42 (1973) (discussing the classic Seventh Amendment doctrine).
92. See Kirst, supra note 91, at 1291.
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rum, thereby waiving the Constitution, simply because it is convenient
to do so. Neither has the Court questioned its own role in bending the
Seventh Amendment to actively help clear court dockets or whether the
Court itself had exceeded its own constitutional powers in doing so.
Nor has the Court discussed by what authority it could impose constitu-
tional requirements on the private ADR forum. During the same two
decades that saw ADR blossom into a parallel system of justice, the
Court's discussion of these larger constitutional questions has remained
largely dormant.
A. The Practical Necessity of Congressional Encroachment on Article III
The Court's traditional separation of powers doctrine, which ema-
nates from the constitutional tripartite form of government, protects
against the accumulation of all power in the hands of any one govern-
mental branch.93 Accordingly, Article III of the Constitution "safe-
guards the role of the Judicial Branch... by barring congressional at-
tempts to 'transfer jurisdiction [to non-Article III tribunals] for the
purpose of emasculating' constitutional courts .... 94
Thus, when the Schor Court explained its traditional Article III ju-
risdiction, it began with its long-standing principle first cited in 1856, in
Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co.: "If Congress
'withdraw[s] from judicial cognizance any matter which, from its nature,
is the subject of a suit at the common law," it runs the risk of improp-
erly encroaching on the federal judiciary.9"
Despite this principle, the modem Court has never questioned the
constitutionality of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) nor examined
whether the Act was a congressional attempt to withdraw common law
claims from the reach of Article III courts. While the FAA's primary
substantive provision stated only that a "contract [of] arbitration ...
shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable,"96 the Act said nothing
about who could arbitrate which claims, in what forum they could be
arbitrated, or whether the arbitral forum could decide common law
93. "The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same
hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective,
may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny." THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 336
(James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961).
94. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850 (1986) (citation
omitted).
95. Id. at 854 (citing Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S.
272, 284 (1855)).
96.9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
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claims.
Early Courts interpreted the scope of the FAA very narrowly,
holding that it did not reach common law claims. In Wilko, the Court
reasoned that the FAA contained "no provision for judicial determina-
tion of legal issues such as is found in the English law."'' Two decades
later, in Gardner-Denver, the Court agreed that, under the FAA, an ar-
bitrator had "no general authority to invoke public laws."98 "He is not a
public tribunal imposed upon the parties by superior authority which
the parties are obliged to accept. He has no general charter to adminis-
ter justice for a community which transcends the parties. ' "
In 1981, in Barrentine v. Arkansas Best-Freight Systems, Inc., Chief
Justice Burger agreed that "[p]lainly, it would not comport with the
congressional objectives behind a statute seeking to enforce civil rights
protected by Title VII to allow the very forces that had practiced dis-
crimination to contract away the right to enforce civil rights in the
courts."" And in 1985, Justice Stevens, dissenting in Mitsubishi, argued
that "[n]othing in the text of the 1925 Act, nor the legislative history,
suggest[ed] that Congress intended to authorize the integration of any
statutory claims." 0'
Nevertheless, by 1991, in viewing the FAA as a reflection of Con-
gress' liberal federal policy favoring arbitration, the Gilmer Court had
shifted the burden to the claimant to show that "Congress intended to
preclude a waiver of a judicial forum for ADEA claims.""" Arguably,
by shifting the burden to the claimant to prove otherwise, the Gilmer
Court regarded the FAA as proof that Congress intended these com-
mon law claims to be resolved outside an Article III court. But, if this
were so, the FAA's congressional scheme surely had to run afoul of the
very disclaimer pronounced in Murray's Lessee; that such a withdrawal
would improperly encroach on the federal judiciary.
Yet, the post-Gilmer Court has not attacked the FAA as a congres-
sional attempt to passively create just such non-Article III tribunals.
97. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427,437 (1953).
98. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36,52 (1974).
99. Id. at 52 n.16.
100. Barrentine v. Arkansas Best-Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 750 (1981) (Burger, J.,
dissenting).
101. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 646 (1985)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). "Until today all of our cases enforcing agreements to arbitrate un-
der the Arbitration Act have involved contract claims .... [T]his is the first time the Court
has considered the question whether a standard arbitration clause... should be construed to
cover statutory claims that have only an indirect relationship to the contract." I&. at 646-47.
102. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,26 (1991).
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Presumably, when Congress passed the FAA in 1925 it expected con-
tract arbitration to occur in some forum. That the AAA, for example,
was founded a year later for the express purpose of fostering the use of
arbitration as an alternate forum, appears to reinforce the notion that
the FAA did, in fact, lead to the creation of non-Article III tribunals to
handle Article III business.
Arguably, the Court's quiet retreat from the FAA stemmed from
particular evidence that Congress never intended to undermine Article
III's jurisdiction. Although Congress saw arbitration as an expeditious
means to resolve contract disputes, and was motivated to enact the
FAA for that reason, 3 the legislative history suggests that Congress did
not aim to have the FAA reach statutory employment claims.
The FAA's history shows that during the Senate Judiciary Subcom-
mittee hearings on the Act, the chairman of the American Bar Associa-
tion committee responsible for drafting the bill had assured the Sena-
tors that the FAA was not intended to be an act referring to labor
disputes. "It is purely an act to give the merchants the right or the
privilege of sitting down and agreeing with each other as to what their
damages are .... Now that is all there is in this."' °4 Similarly, almost
seventy years later, a House report on the 1991 Amendment that added
an ADR clause to Title VII emphasized that the use of ADR mecha-
nisms
[was] intended to supplement, not supplant, the remedies pro-
vided by Title VII. Thus, for example, the Committee believe[d]
that any agreement to submit disputed issues to arbitration,
whether in the context of a collective bargaining agreement or in
an employment contract, [did] not preclude the affected person
from seeking relief under the enforcement provisions of Title
VII.10
Moreover, the House committee report, dated nineteen days before
the Court decided Gilmer, concluded that "this view [was] consistent
with the Supreme Court's interpretation of Title VII" in the Gardner-
103. "Its purpose was to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agree-
ments that had existed at English common law and had been adopted by American courts,
and to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts." Il at 24.
104. Il at 39 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing to the Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 be-
fore a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 9 (1923)).
105. H.R. REP. No. 102-40(I), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 635. Identical lan-
guage can be found in the history of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. See 42
H.R. REP. No. 101-485(111), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,499-500.
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Denver case.O' Thus, the evidence would suggest that Congress never
intended to threaten the federal judiciary by enacting the FAA. Like-
wise, based on the history of the ADR clause in Title VII, it appears
that Congress was satisfied with the Court's narrow FAA interpreta-
tion. Therefore, when the Gilmer Court read a new "national prefer-
ence for arbitration" into the FAA, it appeared to manufacture the
preference from whole cloth. And, by its expansive and pragmatic in-
terpretation of the FAA, the Court had single-handedly shifted statu-
tory claims out of the Article III courts and into the arbitral forum by
sheer judicial will.
The judicial will that seemed to liberally expand the FAA, was also
found in the Court's new tolerance for some limited congressional en-
croachment on its traditional Article III powers. During the same pe-
riod, the Schor Court established its own five-factor balancing test to
determine when a congressional scheme could, in fact, permissibly en-
croach on its Article III jurisdiction: (1) whether the program dealt with
a limited area of the law and did not involve any grant of general juris-
diction to an alternative mechanism; (2) whether the agency could im-
plement its orders, but had to apply to a federal court for enforcement;
(3) whether factual findings could be overturned by a reviewing court if
they were against the weight of the evidence; (4) whether all of the
case's legal rulings were subject to de novo review; and (5) whether the
agency had any additional judicial powers.
However, if the power to arbitrate statutory employment claims was
truly found in the FAA, as the Gilmer Court maintained, then the con-
gressional scheme should have failed all but the second factor in the
Schor balancing test. The arbitral forum had a broad grant of general
jurisdiction under the FAA, factual findings could not be overturned by
a reviewing court, and none of the arbitrator's legal rulings were subject
to de novo review unless made in "manifest disregard" of the law.'7
The arbitrator's power conceivably equated with or exceeded that of a
federal judge: He could suspend or terminate the proceedings, order
identical remedies or relief that could have been awarded in court,
could require witnesses to testify under oath, and even determine who
could attend the hearing. The only limiting factor under the Schor test
was that the arbitrator could not directly enforce his award; parties to a
106. MURRAY, supra note 3, at 674.
107. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 852-53 (1986).
108. Section 10 of the FAA lists specifically the grounds for which an arbitration award
may be set aside by a reviewing court. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994).
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decision had to apply directly to federal court for enforcement. Yet,
this hardly appeared to be a saving factor under the Court's prior
cases.'
9
Admittedly, the Schor Court had set down its factors within the con-
text of a congressional scheme that diverted common law claims to a
federal agency; diversion to a private dispute resolution forum was not
an issue. Yet, the Schor balancing test did not concern itself with the
aggrandizement of congressional power at the expense of the federal
judiciary; rather, the primary concern in Schor was the threat of en-
croachment on the province of Article III.1" Thus, the Schor test would
seemingly apply even if the congressionally enacted FAA diverted core
claims away from Article III and into an arbitral forum. In other words,
the threat, whether from Congress or elsewhere was one of equal dan-
ger. While the Schor Court also included "the concerns that drove
Congress to depart from the requirements of Article III""' among its
balancing factors, then and after, it remained silent on any personal
concerns it alone may have had for also departing from the traditional
requirements of Article III.
Irrespective of the congressional motives behind the FAA, it seems
persuasive that the Supreme Court's persistently broad interpretation
of the FAA's purpose signaled a personal agenda. Coupled with its
more flexible approach to its separation of powers doctrine as outlined
in Schor, the Court now seemed even more inclined than Congress to
expedite the resolution of claims outside the federal courts. Yet, what
the Court historically should have examined as a congressional attempt
to erode the jurisdiction of Article III, it had now judicially blessed.
Overall, it seems inexplicable that the Court could find a new fed-
eral preference in the FAA to validate the shift of statutory claims into
the arbitral forum, while at the same time hide behind the Act's legisla-
tive history in order to save the FAA from constitutional attack. The
Court cannot have it both ways. Either the FAA represented a new
congressional policy favoring arbitration of statutory employment
claims, or it did not. If it did, the FAA clearly encroached on the prov-
109. For example, in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458
U.S. 50 (1982), the Court struck down an agency arbitration scheme solely because it ex-
tended to all civil proceedings arising under Title 11 bankruptcy actions. See id
110. See Schor, 478 U.S. at 856-57 ("[T]his case raises no question of the aggrandizement
of congressional power at the expense of a coordinate branch. Instead, the.., question pre-
sented . ..is whether Congress impermissibly undermined ...the role of the Judicial
Branch.").
111. Id at 851.
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ince of the Article III judiciary. If it did not, then the Court, not Con-
gress, had eroded its own power under Article III.
B. The Practical Necessity of Private Encroachment on Article III
Despite any arguments that the FAA had resulted in congressional
encroachment of the federal judiciary, the Court had nonetheless been
content to regard arbitration as merely a private choice in forum selec-
tion: "By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo
the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum."' 2
Inasmuch as Gilmer had cautioned that "all statutory claims may
not be appropriate for arbitration,"' . and Gilmer's progeny had argued
that not all statutory rights may be waived under an agreement to arbi-
trate, 4 the Court had not regarded the arbitral forum as a threat to its
traditional jurisdiction over statutory claims. As it reasoned in Schor,
the "decision to invoke this forum is left entirely to the parties and the
power of the federal judiciary to take jurisdiction of these matters [was]
unaffected.""'
The Schor Court, however, only reached this conclusion after first
giving pragmatic new meaning to the separation of powers embodied in
Article III, Section 1. Under the Court's traditional view, Section 1 had
two provisions, each serving a separate purpose. The first, its structural
provision, served to protect the role of the independent judiciary within
the constitutional scheme of tripartite government. The second, its per-
sonal provision, served to safeguard litigants' rights to have claims de-
cided before judges who are free from potential domination by other
branches of government."6 In reviewing the constitutional problems ar-
bitration contracts posed, the Schor majority explained that
[t]o the extent that [the] structural principle is implicated in a
given case, the parties cannot by consent cure the constitutional
difficulty for the same reason that the parties cannot by consent
confer on federal courts subject matter jurisdiction beyond the
limitations imposed by Article III, § 2 .... [T]he limitations
serve institutional interests that the parties cannot be expected
112. Mitusbishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,628 (1985).
113. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,26 (1991).
114. See Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
115. Schor, 478 U.S. at 855.
116. See id. at 848.
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to protect."7
Yet, the Court posited no such institutional interest in preserving
the personal provision of Article III. It simply dismissed the safeguard
as a "personal right" that could be waived."8 Aside from stating that it
was reaching this conclusion for "practical reasons," the Court never
explained how a constitutional provision could rise (or fall) to the level
of a constitutional right. Nor did the majority describe why the Court
could cure the slight "structural" constitutional difficulty imposed by
the Schor parties' agreement to arbitrate, when neither Congress nor
the parties could.
Justice Brennan argued persuasively in dissent that the personal
provision and the structural provision of the doctrine were coexten-
sive-"that a litigant may [never] waive his right to an Article III tribu-
nal where one is constitutionally required.""..9  Only where the other
branches have first encroached upon judicial authority, by assigning ju-
dicial power to non-Article III tribunals, may individual litigants be de-
prived of impartial decisionmakers. '2° Justice Brennan warned that "as
117. Id. at 850-51.
118 See id. at 848. The Court offered no support for its transformation of this "provi-
sion" into a constitutional "right" that could be waived, admitting that "our cases have pro-
vided us with little occasion to discuss the nature or significance of this ... safeguard." Id.
Although the Court analogized the "personal provision" of the Framers' separation of pow-
ers concept to the "waiver" of right to trial by jury, etc., no precedent supports the Court's
Article III transmutation. The Court did cite, however, to dicta from its Northern Pipeline
decision. See Schor, 478 U.S. at 849:
Before the Act the referee had no jurisdiction, except with consent, over controver-
sies beyond those involving property in the actual or constructive possession of the
court. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 79
n.31. (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
None of the cases has gone so far as to sanction the type of adjudication to
which Marathon will be subjected against its will under the provisions of the 1978
Act. Id. at 91 (Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (em-
phasis added).
In that event, cases such as these would have to be heard by Art. III judges or
by state courts-unless the defendant consents to suit before the bankruptcy judge-
just as they were before the 1978 [Bankruptcy] Act was adopted. Id. at 95 (White,
J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Arguably, these isolated remarks about an unrelated issue hardly supported the Court's new
Article III conclusion.
119. Schor, 478 U.S. at 867 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
120. See id.
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individual cases accumulated in which the Court finds that the short-
term benefits of efficiency outweigh the long-term benefits of judicial
independence, the protections of Article III will be eviscerated.
12 1
Three years later, in Mistretta v. United States, Justice Scalia confessed
that
the regrettable tendency of [the Court's] recent separation-of-
powers doctrine [was] to treat the Constitution as though it were
no more than a generalized prescription that the functions of the
Branches should not be commingled too much .... [I]n the long
run the improvisation of a constitutional structure on the basis of
currently perceived utility will be disastrous."
Obviously, Justices Brennan and Scalia gave more literal respect to
the doctrine of separation of powers than did the more pragmatic Schor
majority. Alternately, so as to not "defeat the obvious purpose of the
legislation [in Schor] to furnish a prompt, continuous, expert and inex-
pensive method for dealing with a class of [specific] questions of fact,"'"
the Schor majority had reduced a basic constitutional provision to a
waivable right and emasculated the province of its own traditional ju-
risdiction over common law claims.
Since Schor, the modern Court has continued to regard the personal
provision of Article III as nothing more than a personal right subject to
waiver;24 that is, the litigants can remove their claims from the federal
judiciary if their mutual wishes warrant. Yet, the Court has not ac-
counted for how its pragmatic view remains inconsistent with Article
III's three fundamental principles. The first, articulated by Justice
Brennan, concerns the emasculation of the constitutional courts; that is,
only where Congress (or the Court) first allows for an alternate forum
to render legally recognized ADR decisions, would litigants even have a
forum option. Thus, encroachment on Article III's jurisdiction by an-
other branch seems a condition precedent to litigants using an alternate
arbitral forum in the first place.
Second, the pragmatic view plainly ignored the people's more basic
constitutional guaranty to have all their cases tried in courts of record
121. Id. at 863-64.
122. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,426-27 (1989).
123. Schor, 478 U.S. at 856.
124. See Brown, supra note 11, at 1514-16 ("The Supreme Court has treated separation




before Article III judges. This institutional interest, one arguably
paramount to the parties' private interest, is subjugated whenever pri-
vate parties invoke their "personal right" to use ADR. Thus, the mod-
em view has not accounted for this constitutional difficulty, nor ex-
plained why the parties' private interests were now suddenly paramount
to the public's.
Third, the Court's pragmatic interpretation of its old doctrine
plainly ignored that private resolution of controversies arising under the
laws of the United States was one of the very privileges the people sur-
rendered to the federal government. The Court offered no explanation
as to why, individually and incrementally, private litigants can now re-
claim a power constitutionally conferred in 1789. Seemingly, a constitu-
tional amendment should be required to do so.
Overall, the modem Court has seemed untroubled by the wear it
has worked on Article III's fundamental principles for the sake of ex-
pediency. "The trend marks a disturbing departure from the original
objectives underlying the separation of powers. Rather than reinforcing
a governmental design that furthers the public good, the Court's institu-
tional rhetoric suggests an aim of preserving the government for its own
sake." '*2
Clearly, shifting statutory employment claims out of federal courts
only to clear crowded dockets seemingly serves no higher purpose than
to preserve the presently overcrowded federal judiciary. The greater
public good embodied in Article III-the public's right to have its cases
tried before judges insulated from governmental pressure-is incremen-
tally sacrificed every time private litigants are forced to take their dis-
putes elsewhere. Furthermore, the expedient solution the modem
Court so fondly embraces masks the many larger institutional problems
encompassed in using ADR to resolve statutory claims. It hides the fact
that there are simply too few courts to keep pace with the number of
statutory rights Congress creates, it disguises the inequity of private liti-
gants paying for the kind of justice the public has historically been re-
quired to pay for, and it shields the unfortunate result that these same
parties who financially support the public justice system, no longer feel
invited to use it.
C. The Practical Necessity of Constricting the Seventh Amendment
Along with the Court's improvisations to its separation of powers
125. Brown, supra note 11, at 1520.
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doctrine and Article III, over the same two decades the Court also gave
new meaning to the Seventh Amendment.'2 Although Gilmer and Cole
suggested a limit to the types of statutory claims that could be heard in
an arbitral forum, the Court had never articulated which claims must be
given a trial by jury."
Traditionally, the Court had regarded the trial by jury as very dear,
and encroachment on the right had been "watched with great jeal-
ousy."' ' The Declaration of Independence cited the loss of the right of
trial by jury as one of the many abuses of the Crown-a right that his-
torically had been eroded for the sake of efficiency 9 Therefore, it was
unsurprising that the Seventh Amendment was added to the Constitu-
tion to preserve the common law right to a trial by jury and to ensure
that future Congresses were powerless to create new rights and commit
their enforcement to a tribunal other than a court.
30
Yet, two hundred years later, the Atlas Court narrowly construed
the right to trial by jury, citing the same "speedy and expert resolution"
rationale that the English Crown had used to curtail the trial by jury
centuries earlier.13' While Atlas employed the public/private rights dis-
tinction to allow an administrative agency to act in a fact-finding capac-
ity, the agency's efficiency and expertise remained the underlying
theme in the Court's rationale."n While later critics have argued that
the Atlas Court based its Seventh Amendment conclusions on com-
126. "In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dol-
lars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved ..... U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The Sev-
enth Amendment has not been incorporated via the "Due Process Clause" of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Martin H. Redish, Legislative Response to the Medical Malpractice Insur-
ance Crisis: Constitutional Implications, 55 TEX. L. REV. 759, 797 (1977). Thus, the Court's
Seventh Amendment jurisprudence does not apply equally to the states; however, like the
doctrine of separation of powers, the guaranty of a right to trial by jury appears in most state
constitutions. See id.
127. Whether the Seventh Amendment reached a common law claim had historically
been determined by the Court's ability to provide a legal remedy. See Atlas Roofing Co. v.
Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442,459-60 (1977).
128. Teamsters Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 581 (1990) ("The trial by jury is
justly dear to the American people. It has always been an object of deep interest and solici-
tude, and every encroachment upon it has been watched with great jealousy.").
129. See DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776); see also Kirst, supra note 91, at
1339.
130. See Kirst, supra note 91, at 1339.
131. See Atlas, 430 U.S. at 455 ("Congress is not required by the Seventh Amendment to
choke the already crowded federal courts with new types of litigation or prevented from
committing some new types of litigation to administrative agencies with special competence
in the relevant field.").
132. See generally id. at 455-57.
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pletely faulty premises; the holding of Atlas has nevertheless endured.' 3
The Gilmer Court, for example, also focused on the efficient resources
of the New York Stock Exchange and the Securities Exchange Commis-
sion, much as Atlas had rested on OSHA's ability to quickly and fairly
determine the facts in Atlas' claim five years before.34 And as Cole il-
lustrated, it was not long before the public/private rights distinction,
along with the institutional resources of regulatory agencies, disap-
peared altogether, only to be replaced by an even more efficient, all-
volunteer organization to hear the facts in a statutory employment
claim.3
In the criminal context, however, the Court had commonly required
a defendant waiving his right to trial by jury to do so only when the
waiver was knowing and voluntary and made with sufficient awareness
of its consequences.'36 Yet, beginning in the early 1970s, the Court was
intimating that the requirements for waiving the Seventh Amendment
in a civil case need not be as rigid as those in a criminal case, 137 and that
the "practical abilities and limitations of juries" may restrict the right to
trial by jury.'38 The Court, however, had never spelled out in detail the
standards for waiver, nor justified why the waiver of a constitutional
right in a civil case should be different than in a criminal case.'39 Of
course, by 1991, the Gilmer Court had made clear that the practical ef-
fect of signing agreements to arbitrate would presume a knowing waiver
of the right to trial by jury and "having made the bargain to arbitrate,
the party should be held to it."' Overall, the Court had seemingly re-
duced the constitutional values represented by the Seventh Amendment
133. See, e.g., Kirst, supra note 91. Kirst contends that the Atlas Court misinterpreted
the history of the Seventh Amendment by relying only on cases from 1856 and later. Fur-
thermore, he argues that the Atlas Court contrived the "public rights" distinction from dicta
in clearly distinguishable cases.
134. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,30-32 (1991).
135. See Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1480-81 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
136. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
137. See D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185-86 (1972) ("Even if, for pre-
sent purposes we assume the standard for waiver in a ... [civil] case of this kind is the same
standard applicable to waiver in a criminal proceeding ... [o]ur holding, of course, is not
controlling for other facts of other cases.").
138. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970). The Ross Court noted that "prac-
tical abilities and limitations of juries" was one factor that courts could consider in deter-
mining the application of the Seventh Amendment. Id.
139. See Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's Pref-
erence for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and
Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REv. 1, 51 (1997).
140. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33.
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to a low state of importance. Citing only the need to clear crowded
dockets, while rejecting the underlying values of the Seventh Amend-
ment as burdensome, pointed to the Court's clearly unusual constitu-
tionalism. 4'
Moreover, it seemed puzzling that the Supreme Court, duty-bound
to uphold the Seventh Amendment, could require parties to arbitrate
when one litigant was standing in federal court crying "I don't want to
arbitrate;" "I didn't know I was waiving my rights;" and "I had no
choice but to sign this waiver." Equally curious is how the modem
Court could merely claim to be neutral when binding the irresolute liti-
gant to such a waiver of his constitutional rights. Arguably, "[b]y
adopting a preference for arbitration over litigation, and by using this
preference as a rule of construction,... the [Court was] restricting par-
ties' access to litigation no less than if Congress had enacted a statute
requiring private parties to take disputes to arbitration."1 42
As with its separation of powers jurisprudence, in matters of the
Seventh Amendment, the Court's discussion has been noticeably silent
about its own role in the delegation of judicial power to a non-Article
III tribunal.' 43 That the Framers of the Constitution created three
branches of government and armed them with the means to resist the
encroachment of the others-to make the separation of powers self-
executing-they placed no self-executing checks on a willful court.
They thought "the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always
be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution#
44
Moreover, the Framers truly envisioned a judiciary that
ha[d] no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direc-
tion either of the strength or the wealth of the society; and
[could] take no active resolution whatever .... [T]hough indi-
vidual oppression may now and then proceed from the courts of
justice, the general liberty of the people can never be endan-
141. See Kirst, supra note 91, at 1343-44.
142. See Sternlight, supra note 139, at 47.
143. The Court rarely discusses its role in reshaping the constitutional balance. Justice
Blackmun alluded to this concern in United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 685 (1980)
(Blackmun, J., concurring), mentioning that where district courts devolve fact-finding power
on magistrates, the only separation of powers threat is from within. Although Justice
Blackmun did not pursue the matter further, presumably he considered an internal threat no
threat at all.
144. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 490 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright
ed., 1961).
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gered from that quarter. 145
As was clear, the Framers anticipated a judiciary that remained un-
mindful of the strength or wealth of society. Arguably, they never sus-
pected that a modem court, for purposes of expediency, would self-
servingly or single-handedly rewrite the Constitution to clear its calen-
dar. Thus, it remains curious why, over the last two decades, the Court
has seemed increasingly preoccupied with docket-clearing, when-from
an institutional standpoint-the length of its docket should be none of
its concern.
D. The Practical Necessity of Reshaping "Procedural Due Process"
Paradoxically, over the two decades that saw the Court narrow its
own sphere of power over statutory claims and simultaneously constrain
the right to trial by jury, it expanded the reach of due process to touch
the arbitral forum. Seemingly, the Court had felt obligated to legitimize
binding arbitration of statutory claims outside the formal judicial proc-
ess; that legitimacy arose when the claimant's "due process" rights had
at least been tangentially observed in the arbitral arena.'4 After all, the
Constitution did not forbid denying a citizen of life, liberty or property,
but only that the denial must follow "due process of law."
The due process guaranty found in the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution-that "no person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law... "' 47-- originated from English
common law. It first appeared in the Magna Carta as one of those old
English liberties designed to secure subjects from arbitrary action of the
Crown.' 4 That "no free man shall be taken, imprisoned, disseised, out-
lawed, banished,... except by... the law of the land"' 49 referred to the
English common and statute law, and when the principle was constitu-
tionalized in 1791, it referred to the same common law then known to
the colonists.'O
Under the Fifth Amendment, "due process of law" constituted an
145. Id at 490-91.
146. See Werdegar, supra note 1, at 55 ("ADR needs the courts to assure the integrity of
the system, to do so by imposing, as necessary, the fundamental requirements of due proc-
ess.").
147. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
148. See THE MAGNA CARTA, para. 39 (A.E. Dick Howard ed., 1964).
149. Id.
150. See Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 276-80
(1856).
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essential term in the social compact defining the rights of the individual
and limiting the power of the new government. 5' Although the Framers
intended that the fundamental guaranty of due process be absolute,
152
they left its exact boundaries undefined. Ever after, the Court had re-
garded "due process of law" as a living principle: "As in all cases in-
volving what is or is not due process.., no hard-and-fast rule can be
laid down. The pattern of due process is picked out in the facts and cir-
cumstances of each case .....,,s3 "[D]ue process, unlike some legal
rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to
time, place and circumstances."'"
Despite its shifting boundary, the Court had adopted a broad due
process definition, which at a minimum, guaranteed the citizen (1) no-
tice of the proceedings against him, (2) an opportunity to defend him-
self before an unbiased tribunal, and (3) resolution of his claim in a
manner consistent with essential fairness."5
Inasmuch as the Court had at one time hinted that "due process"
may be so rooted in the country's tradition and conscience as to be con-
sidered fundamental and "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,1 56
the Court had never required that private persons guarantee "due proc-
ess of law" to each other.' "Due process of law" was strictly a constitu-
tional provision and the Fifth Amendment said nothing about the rights
of one citizen against the other. Therefore, it seemed strangely curious
that, in 1987, the Brock Court leaped to impose procedural require-
ments on private actors.5' Even stranger was that, four years later, the
Gilmer Court would discuss whether the private NYSE provided ade-
quate procedures to fairly vindicate Gilmer's discrimination claim. 59
And, in 1997, the new dimensions of procedural due process had come
full circle, with the Cole court dictating what procedures the courts
151. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
152. See Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322,379 (1909).
153. Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424, 427-28 (1953) (overruled in part on other
grounds by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969)).
154. Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895
(1961) (citation omitted).
155. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,348-49 (1976).
156. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S 165,169 (1952) (citation omitted).
157. See, e.g., Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989)
(discussing the inapplicability of the "due process clause" of the Fourteenth Amendment to
private conduct).
158. See Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252 (1987).
159. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
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would require private arbitrators to follow in the future.W
The modem Court's attempt to impose "due process" on the arbi-
tral forum, however, yields several constitutional problems. The fore-
most difficulty stems from the Court's apparent wish to constitutional-
ize "due process of law" in the private arbitral forum. But, where
parties have freely opted out of the judicial forum, arguably they should
be left to use any process they mutually choose, rather than an exter-
nally imposed set of procedural rules. While Gilmer simply noted that
the NYSE afforded Gilmer sufficient due process to fairly vindicate his
claim, the D.C. Circuit went much further in Cole and set down process
rules that the arbitral forum must observe in the resolution of statutory
employment claims.161 Yet, the Cole court did not explain who was re-
sponsible for providing the process-either one party as to the other, or
whether the arbitrator to both-nor did it instruct what might result
should due process be denied by any of the three. Nor did the Cole
court identify by what authority it could impose these procedures on the
parties or the AAA.
Traditionally, courts had not intervened in the procedures employed
in binding arbitration. "Parties [could] stipulate to whatever proce-
dures they want[ed] to govern the arbitration of their disputes; parties
[were] as free to specify idiosyncratic terms of arbitration as they [were]
to specify any other terms in their contract."162 Clearly, the modem
courts' attempts to impose "procedural due process" requirements on
private parties ran contrary to their traditional laissez faire approach to
private dispute resolution.
The courts' traditional approach, however, had evolved during a pe-
riod in which binding arbitration was strictly confined to interpreting
contractual provisions. With the advent of statutory claim resolution,
arbitrators now had to go beyond the laws of the shop, industrial tradi-
tions, and written provisions. They had to filter, incorporate and as-
similate court decisions decided on a daily basis under a variety of con-
ditions and situations totally foreign to their own experience.' 6 Yet,
160. See Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
161. See id. at 1484, 1488. The Cole court relied heavily on the due process rules the
AAA had promulgated in 1995, AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASS'N, DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL
FOR MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY DISPUTES ARISING OUT OF THE
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP (1995), and later adopted as its NATIONAL RULES FOR THE
RESOLUTION OF EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES (1997).
162. Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704,709 (7th Cir. 1994).
163. See generally Donna Meredith Matthews, Note, Employment Law After Gilmer:
Compulsory Arbitration of Statutory Antidiscrimination Rights, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 347 (1997).
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while the courts' temptation to intervene in private dispute processes
coincided with the use of ADR to resolve statutory claims, the fact that
it did so should have triggered the courts' alarm, not their intervention.
Second, modem courts have never reconciled the "manifest disre-
gard" standard of review with their new procedural due process man-
date. For example, the traditional standard would only set aside an ar-
bitration award for fraud, corruption, or manifest disregard of the law.'
Even the FAA specifically limited the cases in which the courts could
vacate an arbitration award.'65 Under the courts' new due process man-
date, however, it was unclear whether a procedural violation could or
should result in vacating an arbitrator's decision. But, if violations of
"due process" could not warrant setting aside a decision, there seemed
little point in even imposing the process on the parties.
Third, to justify imposing constitutional due process on private par-
ties, and to remain consistent with the Court's state action doctrine, at
the very least the courts would need to identify some kind of federal or
"state action" that triggered the guaranty.'66 In other words, modem
courts would need to locate a federal or state government regulation
that fosters and encourages the use of private ADR,67 or determine that
the state exercised coercive power to encourage the use of ADR,'1 or,
at the very least, find that the arbitral forum performs a public func-
tion.' 69 While some commentators suggest that this is precisely the con-
ditions under which ADR now operates,70 such a situation seems viola-
tive of the unequivocal language of the Constitution. "The Judicial
Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme court, and in
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.'' Therefore, to argue that the judicial power now somehow
rests in a "junior varsity court," unordained or established by Congress,
164. See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1486-87.
165. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (1994).
166. See, e.g., First Heritage Corp. v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. (NASD), 785
F. Supp. 1250 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (holding that the NASD is not a government entity so there
is no state action or due process violation); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S.
345, 351 (1974) (holding that even though the utility was heavily regulated it was not a state
actor and need not provide due process).
167. See, e.g., Jackson, 419 U.S. 345.
168. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
169. See, e.g., Jackson, 419 U.S. 345.
170. See generally Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State Action Theory of
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 CAL. L. REV. 577 (1977); Sternlight, supra note 139, at 40-
47.
171. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1, cl. 1.
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in the first instance, is quite remarkable. Yet, to argue even further that
the arbitral forum operates as a functional equivalent or is "fostered
and encouraged" by government, in spite of the strictures of Article III,
seems even more indefensible. Finally, to then impose "procedural due
process" on the arbitral forum under the pretense that ADR is really
state action, would seem to bend the Constitution beyond its breaking
point.
In summary, to impose "due process" on the arbitral forum under a
state action theory proves too much; that is, the argument's very foun-
dation-that the arbitrator is actually a state actor-runs afoul of the
very constitutional limitations imposed by Article III. Moreover, im-
posing "procedural due process" on private parties-by constitutional-
izing it-requires the Court to take the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments far beyond their text and far beyond any of the Court's prior
precedents. Likewise, attempting to impose "due process" require-
ments in arbitration proceedings will require the Court to stray far from
its traditional "manifest disregard" standard of review. It must now an-
swer the difficult question of who in the arbitral forum is entitled to
"due process of law," who is now constitutionally required to deliver it,
and even more importantly, what happens when it is violated.
IV. CONCLUSION
Unquestionably, over the past two decades the Court has liberally
fashioned the Constitution to meet the pressing needs of the day. Its
traditional notions of separation of power, the right to trial by jury, and
procedural due process have all had to yield to more expeditiously re-
solve cases and controversies outside the federal courts. Binding arbi-
tration of statutory employment claims would become a matter of
course. Yet, along with the Court's unexplained compulsion to focus on
docket clearing rather than constitutional interpretation, its jurispru-
dence over the past two decades also remains largely silent on the larger
constitutional issues that seemingly should have concerned the Court.
For example, if Congress, indeed, had declared a new national pref-
erence for resolving statutory employment claims in arbitration, then its
preference could only reflect an attempt to emasculate the constitu-
tional courts. Accordingly, Article III precluded such an encroachment.
Alternately, if the Court failed to trigger Article III's structural limita-
tion, then it could only mean that the Court, rather than Congress, was
directing the strength and wealth of society. Surely, the Constitution
could not tolerate such a threat to the general liberty of the people from
the Court's quarter.
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Likewise, if the people adopted a constitutional framework, in part,
to safeguard their collective right to have their cases tried before judges
insulated from majoritarian pressure, then it surely seemed idiosyn-
cratic that persons other than judges could decide statutory claims.
Seemingly, consenting parties could not agree to waive this fundamental
constitutional provision anymore than they could contractually agree
not to be bound by the laws of Congress. Surely, the Constitution could
not withstand such a threat to the people's general liberty from the in-
dividual either.
Furthermore, the Court has never examined its role in manipulating
statutory employment claims out of the federal judiciary. In pretending
to be a passive bystander that merely enforces contracts to arbitrate, the
Court has avoided confronting how radically, over the past two decades,
its new constitutional interpretations have departed from its old juris-
prudence. Voluntary arbitrators can now be factfinders; Congress can
encroach a little on the province of the judiciary; private parties can
now be required to observe due process. Yet none of these new con-
ventions have been enacted by Congress or by constitutional amend-
ment; they have arisen strictly from the modem Court's functional twist
on old constitutional doctrines. Surely, the branch that the Framers
deemed least dangerous to the political rights under the Constitution,
had now taken on a new role in directing the strength and wealth of so-
ciety.
As the two decades reflecting the Court's fondness for ADR come
to a close, its functional constitutionalism has engendered criticism from
many directions. The lower courts,17 the Executive Branch, 73 the ADR
172. See Renteria v. Prudential Ins. Co., 113 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that only
an express Title VII waiver, made known when an arbitration agreement is signed, will con-
stitute a knowing waiver); Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354 (7th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 294 (Oct. 14, 1997) (holding that general grievance arbitration provisions
are insufficient for a knowing waiver); Nelson v. Cyprus Bagdad Copper Corp., 119 F.3d 756
(9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1511 (Apr. 20, 1998) (holding that unilateral acts by
employers will not support a waiver); Rushton v. Meijer, Inc., 570 N.W.2d 271 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1997) (holding that mandatory predispute arbitration agreements are unenforceable
pursuant to public policy).
173. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) position is that re-
quiring an individual to waive his or her right to trial by jury before a discrimination claim
even arises subverts the purposes of Title VII. See EEOC, Policy Statement on Alternative
Dispute Resolution, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 137, at E-13-14 (July 18, 1995) (reaffirmed
July 11, 1997, 571 PLI/Lit 539, 583 (Sep. 1997)). The National Labor Relations Board's
(NLRB) position is that requiring an employee to sign an arbitration agreement is an unfair
labor practice, as is the employee's discharge for not signing. See NLRB, General Counsel
Report January to September 1995, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 36, at E-6-7 (Feb. 23,
1996). The Labor and Commerce Departments' Commission on the Future of Worker-
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profession, 4 and commentators 75 have questioned the Court's routine
shifting of statutory claims out of the federal judiciary. Accordingly, as
the modern Court approaches the turn of the century, it may well be the
last institution that supports a national preference for arbitration.
VICKI ZICK
Management Relations ("the Dunlop Commission"), strongly recommends that binding arbi-
tration agreements not be enforceable as a condition of employment. See Christopher S.
Miller & Brian D. Poe, Arbitrating Employment Claims: The State of the Law, 46 LAB. L.J.
195, 201 (1995).
174. The National Academy of Arbitrators opposes mandatory arbitration as a condition
of employment when it requires a waiver of access to a judicial forum. See National Acad-
emy of Arbitrators, Statement and Guidelines, 103 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at E-1 (May 29,
1997). The National Employment Lawyers Association opposes mandatory predispute
agreements to arbitrate. See Mei L. Bickner et al., Developments in Employment Arbitration,
52 DIsP. RESOL. J. 10 (1997). The National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) voted
to recommend to the Securities and Exchange Commission that the SEC eliminate manda-
tory arbitration of statutory discrimination claims for registered brokers. See Mood Shifting
on Mandatory Employment Arbitration, 52 DISP. RESOL. MAGAZINE 22 (1997).
175. See, e.g., Bompey et al., supra note 2; Brown, supra note 11; Feller, supra note 6;
Dwight Golann, Making Alternative Dispute Resolution Mandatory: The Constitutional Is-
sues, 68 OR. L. REV. 487 (1989); Kirst, supra note 91; Reuben, supra note 170; St. Antoine,
supra note 17; Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool? Debunking the Supreme
Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637 (1996); Sternlight, supra
note 139; Matthews, supra note 163.
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